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Parmenides, Hegel and Special Relativity
Scott Mann
this paper explores two different responses to the metaphysics of Parmenides. it high-
lights the importance of Parmenides in the development of the Hegelian dialectic. and 
it examines some of the parallels between Parmenides ideas and certain interpretations 
of special relativity theory.
Being
Parmenides raised the crucial epistemological question of the appropriate means for 
achieving knowledge of reality. Finding an apparent contradiction between percep-
tion and pure thought, he came down in favour of pure thought. He was thereby 
led to postulate a true reality, or ontological absolute, “unborn and imperishable”, 
“entire”, “alone of its kind”, “unshaken and complete”, “single” and “continuous”. He 
also strongly implies that it is homogenous and eternal.
Parmenides highlights a contradiction between the “being” represented by the “is” 
in the statement “it is not” and the non-existence represented by the “not”. He argues 
that not-being cannot  — by definition — exist, and that nothing can therefore come 
from nothing. as he says, “you could not recognise that which is not nor could you 
mention it...nothing cannot be” (Barnes, 2001:80).
change involves the coming into being of something which didn’t previously exist — 
that was previously characterised by not being, or the passing of that which has being 
into not-being. But it cannot be that something can come from nothing or go to noth-
ing. there is nothing for things to come from or go to. so there is no change.
Plato portrayed Zeno’s paradoxes as designed to defend Parmenides’s philosophy. 
Zeno argued that an arrow shot from a bow never moves; at each instant of its flight it 
is in a place exactly its size — and therefore motionless. But if it’s motionless at each 
instant of the supposed period of its flight then it is motionless for the whole period. 
motion is an illusion of our perception, rather than a true reality.
J. B. Kennedy highlights another argument that probably played a part in Par-
menides’s thinking — the impossibility of transition between contradictory states 
or properties. if a thing is changing from one state or property — e.g. rest — to its 
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contradictory state or property — motion — then the thing must have exactly one or 
both or neither of the properties. it can’t have exactly one property because that would 
put it in the state before or after the change, rather than being in process of change. 
it can’t have both or neither because the properties are contradictories — can’t both 
be true, can’t both be false. so it’s not the case that a thing can be changing from one 
property to its contradictory property (Kennedy, 2003:82–83).
 nor can the world consist of different existing things — separated by space where 
nothing exists. For nothing can’t exist. Zeno was probably extending or defending 
this aspect of Parmenides’s argument when he noted that plurality implies separators 
distinct from the things they separate. there cannot be nothing between two things 
or they would not be distinct. But in order to be distinct from the things separated 
the separators themselves must be separated from the others  — leading to an infinite 
regress (Kennedy, 2003:92–103). so there is just a single, homogenous, unchanging 
existing thing.
this paper considers two different sorts of responses to the Parmenidean argu-
ments by subsequent philosophers. the first, associated with Hegelian dialectic, 
attempts to show how thoroughly anti-Parmenidean ideas can be logically generated 
from such ideas themselves. the second, associated with special relativity theory, 
claims to show how modern science, has, in fact, vindicated key elements of the 
Parmenidean ontology.
Hegel and Parmenides
Hegel sees in Parmenides’s work “thought” first becoming aware of itself as such — as 
a conscious attempt to apply rational thinking to the task of discovering a universal 
organising principle or underlying structure of reality. this is the point at which 
fundamental categories or ideas of such organising principles, previously implicit 
in human perception, thought and action, and in the world as perceived, or thought 
about or acted upon, first begin to become objects for thought; the first explicit for-
mulation of such a fundamental organising category.
Hegel argues that Parmenides is actually striving to articulate the idea of Being 
as prior to all predication or determination. For Hegel, pure immediate, unspecified 
and indeterminate “being” is the starting point of metaphysics insofar as it is the most 
general form of all reality. as errol Harris explains, “whatever anything may be, before 
any distinction of form or content, it must be. it is presupposed in all perception, 
thought or imagination” (Harris, 1983:24).
this first step in the process of abstraction produces a deeply abstract result — but 
it carries the seeds of further progress, through dialectical self-development of 
ideas — to increasingly concrete and differentiated conceptions of ultimate real-
ity. abstraction shows us that pure being is what all existing objects have in com-
mon. so is it the immediate form of subjective awareness — as awareness merely 
of existence.
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as Parmenides suggests, Being is the opposite of nothing. But Hegel observes that 
insofar as pure Being has no external limit, is not distinguishable from anything out-
side itself, and has no internal differentiations or distinctions, it is completely empty 
and indistinguishable from nothing. Hegel refers here to an “identity of opposites”, 
insofar as not-being is both not and Being.
But Hegel also highlights the intrinsically dynamic character of this unity of oppo-
sites. thought, in trying to fully grasp one is inevitably led back to the other. Hegel 
refers to this as the dialectical movement of Becoming. and he agrees with earlier 
greek thinkers that a movement from being to nothing and back to being is “the 
principle of all change, all movement, all acting in the actual world”, as well as the 
principle of all thinking. 
as errol Harris says, this first identity of opposites is the key to Hegelian dialectic. 
subsequent phases become more complex and the process is consequently modified. 
But such modification is itself “implicit in this first triad” (Harris, 1983:96).
Hegel has Parmenides as the first philosopher in his logical reconstruction of the 
history of metaphysics, rather than the historically earlier thales or anaximander. 
Parmenides provides the thesis, followed by anaximenes’s antithesis, arguing a case 
for nothing (the void) as absolute principle, and then Heraclitus’s synthesis, with 
Becoming as absolute.
Motion 
in his book In Contradiction, contemporary philosopher graham Priest refers to 
Bertrand russell’s analysis of motion in his Principles of mathematics (of 1903) as 
the “orthodox” response to Zeno’s arrow paradox. as Priest says, in this account, 
“motion consists in the fact that, by occupation of a place at a time, a correlation is 
established between places and times; when different times, throughout any period 
however short, are correlated with different places, there is motion; when different 
times throughout some period however short are all correlated with the same place, 
there is rest” (Priest, 1987:216).
But “a sequence of states, even a dense and continuous one, indistinguishable from 
corresponding rest states does not seem to be a state of motion” (Priest, 1987:217). 
“technically, though the measure (=length) of the points traversed in an instant is 
zero, the measure of points traversed in a sum of instants may be non-zero (provided 
there are sufficiently, ie. uncountably, many points).” But “how can going somewhere 
be composed of an aggregate of going nowheres?” (Priest, 1987:218). 
as Priest notes, Hegel develops his idea of Becoming as unity of Being and noth-
ing to provide an answer to Zeno’s refutation of motion which also provides an 
alternative to russell’s “orthodox account”. “Hegel is not denying that if something 
is in motion it will be in different places at different times. rather, the point is that 
this is not sufficient for it to be in motion. it would not distinguish it ... from a body 
at rest at each of these moments. What is required for it to be in motion at a certain 
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time is for it both to occupy and not to occupy a certain place at that time.” (Priest, 
1987:219–220).
Parmenides rejects motion and change by virtue of the contradiction he sees as 
inherent in such motion and change. But Hegel seeks to show that the contradiction 
is transcended by recognising the abstract character of both Being and nothing as 
moments within a process of Becoming. and Priest argues that motion can really only 
be distinguished from rest by reference to the material reality of contradiction.
Special relativity 
some would say that aristotle has answered some of Parmenides’s key points. to say 
that x does not yet exist or has ceased to exist does not mean that it is as yet, or has 
passed into, (an existing) nothingness. its pre-existence consisted in some properties, 
powers or potentials of previously existing things, including the raw material of which 
it would come to be composed. it comes into being through the shaping up of such raw 
materials into a new form or structure. and that form will eventually cease to exist- 
while its matter persists in some other form. While nothing can indeed come from 
nothing, new beings or properties of beings come from pre-existing beings or situa-
tions, pre-existing materials take on new forms of organisation or disorganisation.
it is true that there cannot be nothing between distinct things. But the fact that 
one sort of thing has a qualitatively different matter or form from another seems to be 
enough to explain its distinctness from a neighbouring thing insofar as the boundary 
marks the point or surface where character a ends and B begins. 
However, einstein’s special relativity theory casts major doubts upon the ontologi-
cal prioritisation of change and diversity and possibility. it provides good reasons for 
believing that Parmenides could, indeed, have been correct in seeing such things as 
appearances, rather than ultimate realities. 
the key idea here is the constant speed of light measured by observers in differ-
ent states of uniform motion relative to each other. it turns out that this empirically 
supported fact requires radical changes in our ideas the nature of space and time. 
and it does so, in the first instance, through undermining everyday conceptions of 
simultaneity.
the loss of simultaneity is typically illustrated by reference to a train or space-
ship moving rapidly — lets says — leftwards relative to a stationary observer beside 
the track or on a planet. a light situated at the mid point of the cabin of the craft 
is switched on and light beams traced towards two reflecting targets at either end 
of the craft an observer on the vehicle — at the light source — judges the beams 
to have arrived at their destinations simultaneously — both beams travelling equal 
distances with equal constant speeds and returning at the same moment (stannard, 
2008:17).
the ground based observer also sees the light beams leave at the same time. But 
because of the movement of the back of the craft towards the beam (in the course of 
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the journey of the beam) and the front of the craft away from its beam, this observer 
see the backwards directed beam hitting its target first. the backwards beam then has 
further to travel to reach its source on its journey back and the front beam has less far 
to go and the two beams arrive back at the source simultaneously.
Whereas the two observers are agreed about the simultaneity of events that occur 
at the same point in space, they do not agree about the simultaneity of events sepa-
rated by a distance. the problems for those who want to attribute reality only to what 
exists at the present moment — with past dead and gone and the future not yet in 
existence — are clear. different observers, simultaneously present at the same loca-
tion but in different states of relative motion, will each identify a different set of more 
distant events as part of their “present moment”. events which are simultaneous with 
that moment of contact for observer a will be identified by observer B — moving 
towards such events — as in the past and for observer c moving away from such 
events as in the future.
But whereas such observers disagree about the time and space separating particular 
events, special relativity theory provides a formula allowing all such observers to cal-
culate, and agree upon, a single, objective picture of the separation of all such events 
in four dimensional space-time, called the space-time interval. this led Hermann 
minkowski to suggest that perceived space and time displacements were really just 
projections of a deeper four-dimensional reality. 
Just as Parmenides is led to postulate a single continuous unchanging thing, so 
does einstein follow minkowski in postulating a four-dimensional continuum of 
time and space of which objects are merely parts or properties — as world lines or 
paths — no part of whose history has any ontological priority or greater reality than 
any other. more specifically, they are what are called “time-like” world-lines, consisting 
of successive events linked by causal influences propagated at less than light speed, 
in an eternal block universe. 
this “block universe” simply exists in a tenseless and unchanging fashion. as 
stannard says, “changes occur in time. But space-time is not in time; time is in space-
time”. in space-time, “all of space exists at each point of time” and “all of time exists 
each point of space” (stannard, 2008:30).
Illusion of time’s passage
even without reference to relativity it was pointed out long ago that there are major 
problems with an idea of “the passage of time”. the motion of an object is change in 
that objects spatial position (i.e. its relation to other objects) with respect to time. But 
it’s not clear how a moment of time can change its temporal position with respect to 
time. 
those who believe that only the present actually exists, meaning all of three dimen-
sional space at a particular moment of time, so-called “presentists”, can identify the 
passage of time with the successive happening of sets of simultaneous events. 
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But any such ideas are undermined by the relativity of simultaneity. it’s difficult to 
construct a coherent idea of “the present” or the passage of time from the perspective 
of special relativity theory. one view is that of “the back light cones of the transient 
now advancing along a world line” — meaning all of space-time able to causally influ-
ence such a space-time point. another is that of “the successive happening of events 
along a — time-like — world-line”, with the passage of time indicated by a clock on 
the world-line.
But these are definitions of “a” present rather than “the” present, where “a present” 
apparently means an event — or set of events — with the capacity to be “the present” 
of a conscious observer — or participant. 
Subjectivity
there are deep problems of the true relationship between conscious subjectivity and 
the space-time continuum. an image frequently referred to in this context is that of 
“moving an illuminated plane up through the space-time solid”; as rucker says, “first 
one cross section would be lit up, then the next, and so on” (rucker, 1985:43). the 
problem of such an image is that it puts mind outside of space and time and intro-
duces a “second level of time” — the time that lapses as the mind moves its attention 
through space-time. But if space-time is what exists, then “each of us is a space-time 
pattern in the block universe”. the passage of time is, indeed, a kind of illusion, as 
rucker says, “a feeling that goes with being a certain sort of space-time pattern”. 
We must also recognise that the “animated minkowski diagram” as it has been 
called is not an accurate picture of the phenomenology of perception of space and 
time. We do not sit outside the cosmos experiencing a succession of different frozen 
“images” of it. nor do we animate the present by reference to memories in the form 
of such frozen images. 
rather, phenomenological investigation attests to actual experience of an extended 
portion of space-time within which “things happen”. We “replay” our memories within 
this extension, rather than creating the extension out of memories. it somehow seems 
to include both past and future in the sense of both the passing away and coming into 
being of things — within a unity of present-ness. 
We can imagine the scope of such a present expanding to encompass all of past 
and future events. in which case, there is no longer any past or future — of lost or not 
yet born events — but only “before” and “after” in a continuum of space-time.
Disappearing space and time
common sense says that space extends and persists even though we only directly 
experience a bit of it at a time. our experience has nothing to do with the existence 
of space. so why, we could ask, do we imagine that our “movement” through time has 
anything to do with the reality of past and future time? Why should past time cease 
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to exist or future time not yet exist just because we don’t happen to be experiencing 
them at the moment? 
From a presentist perspective, the territory we visited at an earlier stage has now 
ceased to exist — but has been replaced by a new “piece of space” (conjured into 
existence by the previous space at that location as that previous space went out of 
existence) which is part of our new present. But even a presentist would accept that 
our movement has nothing to do with the ongoing regeneration and persistence of 
space. if we think of presentism as the illusion of disappearing time rather than the 
illusion of passage, this is perhaps a first step to dealing with the apparent contradic-
tion — between common sense and the space-time continuum. 
From a relativistic perspective there is no — separate — space or time, but only the 
events of space-time. the illusion of disappearing space is the same as the illusion of 
disappearing time. We merely think of space as separate from time because we think 
we can return to the same place we were at in the past, not to the same time. But really 
we are considering the world line of events which is us, rejoining some other world 
line of events, which we identify as a “particular place”. insofar as the rejoined events 
are quite different events from those of the prior point of intersection, Heraclitus is 
correct in saying that we cannot step twice into the same river. on the other hand, 
such a world-line of (causally related) events is all that can be meant by the same 
river — or the same person — from the eternalist perspective.
Conclusion
the world of change and causation, of diversity and plurality and possibility, of past 
and future, doesn’t have to be thought of as wholly “subjective”, illusory or unreal. 
Presumably it represents real structural features of the continuum refracted through 
conscious subjectivity. 
Passage is not really an illusion but rather our awareness of the differences between 
contiguous events — or sets of events. What we call the coming into — or passing 
out of — being of a thing is really a part or property of the continuum — the fact 
that a particular worldline of structurally related events terminates or commences at 
a particular spacetime location. 
russell’s orthodox, relational account of motion — in modified form — survives 
the transition to the four dimensional continuum. What Priest identifies as its major 
weakness, turns out to be a clear presentiment of the nature of that continuum. 
While it is not true that the present creates the future, our understanding of causa-
tion still reflects deep structural relations between contiguous events and structures of 
events. strands or worldliness of patterns of events exhibit a high level of “directional” 
structure and organisation — including both the emergence of local order through 
input of energy and the increase of entropy of the wider system.
nonetheless, the fact that relativity theory seems to be both logically consistent, 
and to have sustained a solid record of empirical verification in the years since its 
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original formulation, provides reason to believe that Parmenides could have been 
fundamentally correct. the aristotelian-Hegelian world of diversity and transforma-
tion is not the ultimate ontological reality. 
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